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What You See Is What You (Don’t) Get: A Comment on Funke’s (2014) Opinion Paper  
In an opinion paper published in this journal, Funke (2014) argues that two different types 
of assessment instruments for complex problem solving (CPS), computer-simulated 
microworlds (CSMs) and minimal complex systems (MCSs), might require different types of 
causal cognition. CPS denotes the ability to successfully deal with new, intransparent, and 
dynamically changing problem situations (Funke, 2001) and is considered one of the most 
important skills of the 21st century. Given the recent attention CPS has received from both 
academic and educational stances, for instance, through the Programme for International 
Student Assessment, which tested CPS in 15-year-old students across more than 40 countries 
(OECD, 2014), the topic addressed by Funke (2014) is both timely and of high relevance. 
In this commentary, we will elaborate on the difference between specific CPS assessment 
instruments used in a variety of research fields (e.g., experimental psychology, educational 
assessment) and CPS as the underlying attribute, and we will offer a view that diverges from 
Funke’s (2014). We will express our hope that different CPS assessment traditions that are 
reflected in CSMs and MCSs will converge toward a generalizable understanding of CPS as 
an unobserved latent attribute (i.e., a psychological concept) that is of relevance to 
researchers from a number of fields including experimental psychology and individual 
differences research. Before alluding specifically to Funke’s opinion paper, we would like to 
specify our terminology. Funke uses the terms CPS and MCS for the two types of 
assessment. However, CPS denotes a psychological attribute and not a specific set of 
assessment instruments. Thus, we will use the established terms computer-simulated 
microworlds (CSMs) and minimal complex systems (MCSs), and we will reserve the term 
complex problem solving (CPS) for the latent attribute that both types of assessments claim to 
tap into. 
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Funke (2014) argues that the usefulness of CSMs and MCSs for measuring CPS depends 
on the field of study. CSMs, with their realistic and highly complex setup, their many 
interrelated variables, and their knowledge-rich semantic embedding, are best applied in 
experimental settings, whereas MCSs, with an analytical approach that is geared toward 
reducing complexity and a high level of standardization, are best suited for (educational) 
assessment purposes. This position is reflected in the predominant use of CSMs in 
experimental and cognitive research (e.g., Dörner, 1980) and of MCSs in (educational) 
assessment (e.g., Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012). On the basis of task analyses, Funke 
claims that the type of causal cognition, the heuristics, and the strategies required in CSMs 
and MCSs differ substantially and, thus, do not allow for direct comparisons between the 
two. 
For any study, it is of crucial importance that the employed measures – be they CSMs or 
MCSs – tap into the construct they claim to capture even though the measures may differ 
with regard to their difficulty or their surface features. Admittedly, CSMs and MCSs look 
quite different at first sight. CSMs are knowledge-rich and simulate complex real-world 
scenarios such as business companies (e.g., the Tailorshop) or entire cities (e.g., Lohhausen), 
whereas MCSs are knowledge-lean and less complex. But can we really conclude, on the 
basis of purely conceptual task analyses, that they tap into different types of causal cognition? 
And if so, what is it that they tap into? Fifteen years ago, Süß (1999) had already provided 
important empirical guidance on this question with regard to the construct validity of CSMs. 
He showed that the performances in three different CSMs were moderately correlated—
which was to be expected given that they supposedly all measured CPS. More importantly, 
when controlling for fluid intelligence and specific prior knowledge, the correlation dropped 
to nonsignificance. In the terms of contemporary theories on the human intellect (McGrew, 
2009), the shared variance of three CSMs originated from fluid intelligence and (specific) 
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prior knowledge. That is, the type of causal cognition required to successfully master CSMs 
is empirically identical to the causal cognition required for standard tests of fluid intelligence. 
Provocatively, one could state that the Tailorshop, probably the best-known microworld 
included in Süß’s study, requires nothing but fluid intelligence and inductive reasoning as 
well as specialized knowledge about how companies work. Following this, the strong impact 
of context in CSMs and the substantial advantages for participants who possess this specific 
knowledge are not only assets of CSMs that make them more realistic but also disadvantages 
that distort the measurement of the underlying attribute and the cognitive processes 
associated with it. In addition, the high complexity of CSMs (sometimes up to 1,000 
variables) does not allow for a complete causal analysis—an asset according to Funke. 
However, this may also lead to unsystematic variance created by the fact that subjects have to 
deal with an environment that is basically unpredictable for them. That is, CSMs may 
produce unsystematic variance because they are just too complex and leave participants with 
no choice but to either guess or apply some general reasoning skills that are also found in 
classical intelligence and reasoning tests. And neither guessing nor abstract reasoning are 
distinctive features that are found in contemporary definitions of CPS as unique 
characteristics. Thus, despite their high face validity, empirical evidence suggests that CSMs 
may fall short of tapping into the type of causal cognition unique to CPS or causal cognition 
at all—a point not mentioned in Funke’s (2014) paper. 
Indeed, reports such as the one by Süß (1999) have led to a notable decline in the number 
of studies on CPS using CSMs in the late 1990s and the early 2000s because they questioned 
the empirical usefulness of CSMs and the existence of CPS as a latent attribute. It was argued 
that CSMs were unable to provide any evidence suggesting that they tapped into other than 
already well-known and established attributes such as reasoning and prior knowledge. At the 
same time, efforts were undertaken to solve the aforementioned issues by introducing more 
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formalized CPS assessments that focused on the core features of CPS such as dynamics, 
complexity, and intransparency and that tried to minimize the impact of unsystematic and 
construct-unrelated variance (e.g., Funke, 2001; Kröner, Plass, & Leutner, 2005). One of 
these efforts cumulated in the development of MCSs (e.g., Greiff et al., 2013). 
Obviously, avoiding any unnecessary ballast in favor of a focus on the core attribute of 
CPS comes at a cost: severe reductions in face validity. MCSs lack the appealing and 
attractive real-world resemblance of CSMs, which constitute a much more prosaic assessment 
environment. At the same time, we should ask whether the complex contextual embedding of 
CSMs has ever been shown to allow valid conclusions about participants’ abilities to act 
efficiently in the real-world context simulated by CSMs. In this regard too, results are rather 
mixed because experience and expertise with the real-word context do not necessarily 
warrant better decisions in CSMs (Chapman, Nettelbeck, Welsh, & Mills, 2006; Elliott, 
Welsh, Nettelbeck, & Mills, 2007; but see also Putz-Osterloh & Lemme, 1987). To this end, 
we do agree with Funke (2014) that MCSs lack the appeal of the complex real-world problem 
situations that are found in CSMs, but we respectfully disagree with his notion that MCSs 
capture a type of causal cognition that does not require the use of heuristics (Greiff et al., 
2013) or of sophisticated strategies (Müller, Kretzschmar, Greiff, & Wüstenberg, in press).  
Interestingly, the use of strategies and heuristics relates directly to the question of cultural 
differences in CPS. In one of the few studies addressing this topic, Strohschneider and Güss 
(1999) report that different cultural backgrounds have an impact on the type of strategy and 
heuristics used in CSMs. It is important to understand whether such cultural differences 
originate from different prior knowledge (e.g., the kind of business knowledge needed in the 
Tailorshop might vary a great deal across cultures) or whether they constitute genuine 
differences in the underlying cognitive processes of CPS (e.g., it might be that culturally 
different conventions impact the way problems are approached). To this end, data on the 
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processes taking place in CPS derived from computer-generated log files provide a useful 
tool for further penetrating the actual behavioral correlates in both CSMs and MCSs. For 
instance, Wittmann and Hattrup (2004) used log file analyses to show that boys tend to 
outperform girls in the Tailorshop because of a lower level of risk aversiveness reflected 
through more and stronger interventions in the system, which led, in turn, to better problem 
solutions. 
An abundance of research questions await answers on how cultural background might 
influence the cognitive processes that occur when people tackle complex problems. But here 
again, we should ask whether these scientific challenges can be better addressed with CSMs, 
which are related to a real-world embedding almost necessarily bound to the cultural context 
of the real-world environment that is simulated or with the more context-free and perhaps 
more culture-free instruments provided by MCSs. In building up further knowledge on CPS, 
we will need a clear distinction between face validity on the one hand and the underlying 
CPS attribute and its defining characteristics on the other. Valid CPS assessments that serve 
the purpose of researchers from different fields, whether in the form of CSMs or MCSs, 
should be developed along the lines suggested by Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden 
(2004) who state that “a test is valid for measuring an attribute if and only if (a) the attribute 
exists and (b) variations in the attribute causally produce variations in the outcomes of the 
measurement procedure” (p. 1061). For CPS assessments, both questions remain unanswered 
for the time being. Empirical rigor and scrutiny are needed more than anything else so that 
the construct validity of CPS measurements can be guaranteed, implying a process that 
cannot be driven mainly by the desire for face validity, however appealing this facet might 
be. Herein, we do not see a dissociation between experimental- and assessment-oriented 
studies but a potential synthesis that jointly works toward an understanding of complex 
problem solving as a latent attribute beyond its specific assessment instruments.
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